The Egyptian Military: Mubarak’s Friend Or Foe?
but people are asking for regime change
not a change in the regime!
How long empty? |
Ah, Egypt. The land of various and sundry mysteries where, this week, the newest mystery is 82 year old President Hosni Mubarak’s future – and Egypt’s. Yesterday, in response to the riots throughout the country, Mubarak disbanded his government (exempting himself), and promised reform, hinting at promoting better living conditions, encouraging fewer horrific beatings by his police force, and rooting out corruption.
His strongest words, however, stressed that his first responsibility was to restore order, and this he did by dispatching the army to back up his police force. Punching up the police with the army would seem to provide Mubarak a modestly reliable cohort, yet news reports indicate soldiers, particularly conscripts, were doing little to control the riots, and were often on friendly terms with the demonstrators they are there to suppress and control.
This isn’t too surprising since the Egyptian all male army is largely manned by conscripts between the ages of 20 and 30. Their loyalty to Mubarak, demographically, appears on the surface to be another mystery not yet solved. Given that the average age in Egypt is 20, demographically, this young conscript army has far more in common with the rioting revolutionaries than with a leader they may consider well past his prime.
A key, perhaps the key, to this revolution – whether Mubarak stays or goes – will be the soldier in the ranks and where he places his ultimate loyalty. Will he, if ordered, fire into crowds of people more like him than like the octogenarian Mubarak and his corrupt crew?
A necessarily related question arises: Will army personnel engage the police force? Both forces are massive – Egypt’s police force and army both have hundreds of thousands actives and reserves; Egypt’s armed forces
are among the larger in the world. The question of loyalties of the armed forces and the police is not merely academic, it’s strategic.
The police force, with its reputation for brutality and corruption, is widely hated, while the armed forces are generally viewed with respect. It is the police force (and the secret police) that has done the dirty work in Mubarak’s Egypt. The army, by contrast, has rarely been used for internal security – the last time was in 1986 to quash a mutiny by security forces in Cairo. Moreover, on the ground today and yesterday, individual soldiers have offered aid to demonstrators, as you’ll see in the video below.
One may also be certain that brass of the armed forces are not making decisions in an international vacuum. As the United States’ strongest ally in the region, Israel’s peace pact partner, and the recipient of $1.4 Billion in U.S. military aid this year, Egypt’s strategic importance is obvious and vital. The U.S. government, speaking through Secretary of State Clinton and the President, presently are tacking carefully through a howling headwind – no firm commitment to protect Mubarak, no commitment to explicitly ally with the protesters. The U.S. message is the usual superpower message, urging calmer heads on all sides, although asking – pleading – with Mubarak to listen carefully to his people’s grievances and to act on them.
Yet, we know how the security apparatus works, in this, and any other powerful country with a stake in virtually everything that occurs in the Middle East. Surely, there are back channels operating here. Undoubtedly the reach all major players in this unfolding – may we say? – revolution. Actually, if the latest Egyptian mystery is to be decided anywhere outside of Egypt, the U.S. government would like to believe that it is here, employing the “usual suspects” — CIA analysts and their in-country contacts; State Department fixers and diplomats; Pentagon warlords; White House “special advisers this,” “special advisers that,” and campaign 2012 prognosticators; and, yes, Treasury officials, IMF mavens, business titans, and craven bankers.
What will they decide that Egypt may be “allowed” to do? Are they already too late to make a difference?